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Abstract: A Smart Home is characterized by the presence of a huge number of small, low power
devices, along with more classical devices. According to the (IoT) paradigm, all of them are expected
to be always connected to the Internet in order to provide enhanced services. In this scenario, an
attacker can undermine both the network security and the user’s security/privacy. Traditional
security measures are not sufficient, because they are too difficult to setup and are either too weak
to effectively protect the user or too limiting for the new services effectiveness. The paper suggests
to dynamically adapt the security level of the smart home network according to the user perceived
risk level what we have called network sentiment analysis. The security level is not fixed, established
by a central system (usually by the Internet Service Provider) but can be changed with the users
cooperation. The security of the smart home network is improved by a distributed firewalls and
Intrusion Detection Systems both to the smart home side as to the Internet Service Provider side.
These two parts must cooperate and integrate their actions for reacting dynamically to new and on
going threats. Moreover, the level of network sentiment detected can be propagate to nearby home
networks (e.g., the smart home networks of the apartments inside a building) to increase/decrease
their level of security, thus creating a true in-line (IPS). The paper also presents a test bed for
Smart Home to detect and counteract to different attacks against the IoT sensors, Wi-Fi and Ethernet
connections.
Keywords: Internet of Things; security; dynamic protection
1. Introduction
In a Smart Home environment several specific home automation devices, (e.g., temperature
monitoring sensors, air quality devices, infotainment system, Smart TVs, fire and/or gas detectors, etc.)
might need to communicate with the external networks (e.g., smoke detection alarm) and receive
commands to perform various actions (e.g., increase the temperature in the house or remotely monitor
with surveillance cameras unattended rooms or child’s rooms).
The more the home becomes smarter, the more the problem of cyber security becomes important.
As a matter of fact, several recent attacks have been performed by exploiting vulnerabilities of small
devices (e.g., My Friend Cayla, a famous toy [1] attacked for configuration mistakes, i.e., default
password unchanged), and by using this high number of devices as sources for (DDoS) attacks (see for
example [2] or the malware Mirai in the 2016 [3,4]). Moreover, malicious attacks may bring a significant
impact not only to the network security but also to the safety of the user. For example, by using Internet
device–scanning search engines such as Shodan (https://www.shodan.io), it is possible to obtain a
list of home surveillance cameras with their IP addresses, geographic locations, etc. [5]. A burglar
can control when the IP webcam is more frequently accessed and consequently can understand if the
house owner is away from the house.
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Unfortunately, the obvious security approaches are not really feasible: (i) upgrading the software
of the vulnerable appliances is often impossible (the end-users have often limited capabilities),
(ii) substituting them with more secure devices is not a viable solution (too expensive for Home
scenario), and (iii) blocking their traffic preemptively might prevent their functionality altogether.
Moreover, classical security approaches (i.e., the use of restrictive rules for firewalls, strong
authentication system to access the network, e.g., IEEE 802.1X) are designed for those attacks which
are not in the interior network while the IoT devices are vulnerable to intrusion both from Internet
than from wireless attacks originated from inside the smart home network.
To make effective the connections of resource-constrained IoT devices the IPv6 over Low-Power
Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN) are standardized [6], empowered by protocols such
as 6LoWPAN adaptation layer [7], Routing Protocol for Low Power and Lossy Networks [8] and
the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [9,10]. The 6LoWPAN network uses compressed IPv6
protocol for networking and IEEE 802.15.4 as data-link and physical layers protocol. Each layer in
6LoWPAN can be vulnerable to security threats and, unfortunately, standard preventive security
mechanisms, such as cryptography and authentication, cannot detect all possible attacks, such as
insider attacks (e.g., routing attacks) or a guy who uses a legal key but has malicious intent.
As consequence, (IDS)s specifically designed for IoT are necessary as a second line of defense
to provide more security awareness and to add some dynamic threat protection functionalities to a
network.
All these actions are not easy for a normal user, and they limit the network usability. For these
reasons the network security is often neglected in many domestic networks, and even in some
enterprise ones. We believe that the network itself must adaptively react to new threats, increasing
the security measures when there is an effective, on going, vulnerability exploitation, and relaxing
the rules when there is no real threat. In the following, we will call the dynamic threat evaluation as
network sentiment analysis.
With respect to this, the paper shows an architecture, called SHIELD, with a distributed firewalls
and threat analysis system. One part of the security infrastructure must be as close as possible to the
user, potentially at the user’s premises, and another part in the (ISP) network.
Our contribution over the state of the art is about the way these elements should be integrated.
In the past the firewalls acted as separate entities. We argue that all the user firewalls and IDSs should
be part of an integrated ecosystem, reacting dynamically to new and ongoing threats. In this vision,
the whole system should be orchestrated by a coordinator hosted by the ISP (or by any secure and
trusted provider), which is responsible for evaluating the risk measure of each user and of the ISPs as
a whole. In this vision, if the network sentiment level of a smart home network is increased due to
the risk of attack, this information can be propagated to the nearby smart home networks (e.g., in the
different apartments in the same building) which can take counteractions automatically establishing a
real time Intrusion Prevention System (IPS).
The network sentiment approach will:
• Ease the network security setup,
• Make it more reactive toward incoming threats,
• Keep the number of security rules to the minimum necessary to guarantee an adequate security
and
• Increase the security level in networks geographically close or with similar characteristics in terms
of firmware of devices, connections and applications.
Moreover, the paper also presents a testbed able to detect and react against attacks on Ethernet,
Wi-Fi connections and IoT protocols. The testbed described in the paper has the goal to outline that the
proposed SHIELD architecture is feasible. Toward this end, the hardware used in the testbed reflects
as much as possible a normal Linux-based Customer Premises Equipment (CPE). As a consequence,
we expect that implementing the SHIELD functionalities on a commercial CPE will be very easy.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief overview of the state of the art
in the field of security and privacy challenges and threat models for smart home environment and
IoT. Section 3 outlines the proposed security framework, called SHIELD system, for smart home
highlighting the main characteristics of the dynamic network sentiment analysis and threat reactions.
Section 5 shows the implemented smart home test bed. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss security and
privacy solutions for smart home environment and future directions are provided.
2. Related Works
In a IoT smart home scenario many small, low power, low computation devices are used in the
segment of home automation to improve the quality of services and, as consequence, the quality of
experience offered to the users [11]. Different aspects for preserving privacy can be found in [12]
and several papers in literature examine the security challenges and threats suited for smart homes,
as in [6,13], where surveys of existing protocols for secure communications on IoT can be found,
together with open challenges and research issues in this area. In [14] a protocol is proposed to secure
route optmization and handover management, which uses trust between Proxy mobile IPv6 (PMIPv6)
domain and smart home to ensure security as well as performance over the path between mobile nodes
and home IoT devices. In [15], the authors propose a secure scheme for data uploading on Cloud to
guarantee the integrity of the data with a session key generation assisted by the home gateway. In [5],
a review of existing network techniques for enhancing IoT security is provided together with future key
technologies for trusted Smart Home systems such as system auto-configuration and security update.
A gateway architecture is chosen as the most appropriate for resource-constrained devices and for
high system availability. In [16] the authors propose a cross layer method to overcome the traceability
of the user in smart home networks 6LoWPAN . In this case, the IEEE 802.15.4 standards [17] foresees
to cipher the payload but leaves out the headers containing the layer 2 addresses of the source and
destination of the packets. In the proposed method all the nodes change periodically all their addresses,
both at layer 2 and 3, to secure of both the 802.15.4 and 6LoWPAN protocols.
However traditional Information and Communications Technology (ICT) standard security
solutions, such as crytography and authentication tecniques, do not prevent all possible attacks
and are not tailored for smart home environment due to the resource-constrained IoT devices, to their
heterogeneous interaction and to their different policy and connectivity domains.
As consequence, IDSs are required to detect intruders and malicious activities to threaten the
network. IDSs can be classified in signature-based or behavior-based. Signature-based IDSs use
pattern-matching techniques to detect an attack, while behavior-based IDSs analyze the devices
behavior to detect anomalies. The first type is best suited for known attack and the second one for
unknown attacks. Hybrid detection technique combining signature and anomaly based approaches
can improve the efficacy of IDS.
Furthermore, IDSs can be classified in Host, Network or Distributed. Host IDSs only process
the data of a single node, Network IDSs are able to monitor a network (typically one or more links),
and Distributed IDSs are able to process the data of multiple, independent probes and/or multiple
federated IDSs. Several IDSs are designed for wireless sensor networks (WSN), a general survey on
IDS and IPS can be found in [18]. However, these IDSs are not directly applicable for IoT because IoT
devices are globally accessible, are resource-constrained, are heterogeneous, adopt new protocols such
as COAP, RPL. A survey of more IoT-oriented IDSs can be found in [19–22].
Most of these IDSs focus only on threats at network layer. Examples of real-time IDS for IoT
can be SVELTE [23] which meets the requirements of IPv6-connected IoT devices and detects routing
attacks such as sink-hole, selective forwarding, and spoofed or altered routing information; Complex
Event-processing (CEP) [24] which detects events in real-time by analyzing the stream of information;
the IDS by [25] which targets Denial of Service (DoS) attacks on RPL.
In [26] an intrusion detection and prevention framework is proposed to detect DoS attacks on the
network and attacks against the normal operations rules of the CoAP protocol.
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An IoT security framework for Smart Home is introduced in [27] and a general threat model to
recognize the vulnerabilities for IoT services against cyberattacks is analyzed. A smart home testbed is
considered to monitor variables and control elements with different protocols such as Wi-Fi, ZigBee,
etc. An IDS based on anomaly behavior analysis (ABA) of the end nodes operations allows to detect
and classify a wide range of attacks against IoT devices, such as replay attacks, delay attacks, (DoS) or
DDoS attacks, noise injections, etc.
In [28] a security framework for home network is proposed with residential gateways as devices
responsible for the exchange of information between the ISP infrastructure and the customer network
to develop a vastly distributed IDS/IPS, enforcing preventive or corrective countermeasures, according
to the instructions issued by the ISP. This securiy framework, as other papers in literature, foresee to
move the security intelligence in the ISP. In our system, only the bare minimum necessary to calculate
the users’ similarity score is known by the ISP, while the actual countermeasures (i.e., the network
configuration) is left to the smart home side (SHIELD Home (SH) device). This enables scalability
(because the ISP does not have to address all the users’ CPE details), fine-grained configuration (the
SH device knows more precisely the actual user’s network configuration), and it allows the user (if he
is an expert) to override the security setup proposed by the ISP. Moreover, our solution provides a
high degree of flexibility with respect to the different IoT networks, which are often user-owned and
deployed. These networks are difficult to manage by the ISP in a “pure” centralized way and all
the current approaches are not sufficiently reactive and dynamic to protect the smart environments
adequately. As a matter of fact, in the current architectures attacking a network triggers only a local
response, and it does not have any system-level reaction. We believe that our network sentiment analysis
fills the gap between actual network security techniques and a more coordinated reaction system.
3. SHIELD System
In a Smart Home each Internet-connected device has its own peculiar security and availability
requirements. There are still a number of issues to be addressed, particularly in the IoT network
section, related to the devices deployment and initialization.
As mentioned in the Introduction, we believe that the real problem is to have a dynamic security
protection system able to react to possible threats by reconfiguring in real-time the security defenses of
the network (e.g., firewalls). As a matter of facts, the main problem with traffic filtering is the user.
If the firewall is too restrictive, the user (if he/she is an expert) will disable (or circumvent) it. If the
firewall is too restrictive, it is useless. Moreover, the vast majority of the users do not have the technical
skills to understand the firewall configuration and to autonomously update the firewall rules if a new
threat is discovered.
A common approach is to protect the user with an ISP-level firewall, but this architecture is not
scalable and it does not adapt to the needs of different users. Moreover, the attack could be originated
from inside the Smart Home network thanks, e.g., to an infected mobile device. For this reason we
think that it is mandatory to provide both types of protection: at ISP level and in the user’s premises.
Therefore it is necessary the use of IDSs to add end-to-end threats protection to the smart home network
and the Internet [29].
Signature-based and anomaly behaviour-based IDSs are extremely useful, but they are even more
difficult to configure for the end-user. Moreover, any IDS kind is subject to a lot of false warnings,
either false positives or about attacks that cannot succeed (e.g., an attack aimed at a type of device
that is not in the network). In order to avoid an excessive computational complexity on the IDS,
only the relevant threats for a given network should be trapped, plus the ones that are believed to be
actively being exploited by attackers. As a consequence, IDS as well must be dynamically configured
in response to on going threats. Moreover, signature and anomaly based IDSs analyze usually data
traffic while new IDS should be specifically designed for IoT smart home environment where the
attacks can also be the altering, e.g., of the reported data from sensors, or the controls of actuators.
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In 6LoWPAN networks, 6LoWPAN border routers (6LBR) are used to integrate the WSN
with Internet and thanks to their resources availability they can support intrusion detection
system and generate alerts. As consequence, a hybrid topology for IDSs can be envisaged where
detection capability are distributed and with a central unit responsible for decision operations
and countermeasures.
For this reason, we propose to adopt the architecture outlined in Figure 1. This architecture is
designed to guarantee the interoperability with existing Internet standards and the communications of
sensing devices with other Internet components in the context of future IoT distributed applications.
Wireless
devices
Wired
devices
IoT
devices
SHIELD	HOME:
-	Firewall
-	IDS	Aggregator
SHIELD	CN:
-	Firewall
-	IDS	
SHIELD	logic	unit:
-	Database
-	Sentiment	Analysis	processor
Figure 1. SHIELD Architecture.
In Figure 1, we outlined the three major components of a Smart Home environment: devices
connected by high-bandwidth wireless networks (typically Wi-Fi), devices connected through cables
(Ethernet, Power Line Communications, etc.), and IoT devices—in the figure the IoT devices are
represented as IEEE 802.15.4 nodes, but other standards are possible. Furthermore, IoT devices can be
differentiated according to their role and their security/reliability requirements [30].
Each device type and every connection technology needs its own particular detection approach.
As an example, wired connections need only a wiretap on the main switch (usually the home gateway),
while special receivers will be needed for wireless connections (e.g., high gain antennas).
To detect attacks in multihops networks (e.g., IEEE 802.15.4) it is possible to use multiple probing
point on special nodes. It is worth noticing that the probe points should be connected to a master IDS
engine through a secure side-channel, and that the load balancing between the master IDS and the
probes depends on the side-channel congestion and the energy consumption of each device. Even if
this is an important point, we will not further analyze it, leaving a full analysis to a future paper.
In the security system for a smart home, hereafter called SHIELD system, the (SCN) is the
element in the ISP network that is responsible for (a) firewalling the ISP and users networks from
attacks originating from the outside of the ISP network, (b) analyzing the traffic to spot suspicious
traffic and (c) collecting all the data from the ISP IDS.
The network element responsible for protecting the home network side is the (SH). From a logical
point of view, the entities are two, the SHIELD Firewall and the SHIELD IDS Aggregator. The first is
responsible for filtering the traffic from and to the ISP, while the second controls and harmonizes all
the different IDSs present in the SH network.
The SH is responsible for (i) correctly configuring the IDS to match the threats that are meaningful
for the Smart Home environment (e.g., by silencing the alarms for patched devices), (ii) activating
security countermeasures (e.g., firewall rules, to block further communications from the attacked
sensor) for actively exploited vulnerabilities.
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The ‘core’ of the SHIELD architecture is the (SLU). This entity receives all the (anonymized) IDSs
alarms and warnings from all the SH in the ISP domain. The SLU focuses on discovering various
relations between individual warnings/alerts and, according to alert correlation scores, it can change
the Network Sentiment level and take various countermeasures, e.g., modify the firewalls configurations,
block further communications from the attacked IP address, up to block further communications
between the attacked Smart Home domain and Internet. In the SLU, the Network Sentiment processor
analyzes similarities scores among different smart home networks, in order to implement preemptive
countermeasures in these networks. As a matter of fact, it is more than possible that an attack will
propagate to smart home networks ‘close’ to the network under attack, as shown in Figure 2.
The SLU logic is presented in Figure 3, where it is outlined the different behavior with respect to
an ongoing attack (Alarm) and to a possible attack (Warning). The first triggers an immediate reaction,
while the second is evaluated according to the frequency of similar warning alerts, and the presence of
similar warnings sent by different users. The SLU evaluates the attack type, the possible outcomes,
and can select the most appropriate mitigation techniques, eventually modifying the ISP-level firewall
rules. However, the most important element of the SLU is, in our opinion, the capability to propagate
the Network Sentiment, i.e., the overall status of the network with respect to on going attacks, to the
different SH units. This feature enables a preemptive security approach, where a SH is ‘immunized’
from an attack that did target another SH (Figure 2).
Moreover, the SLU can issue periodic or triggered warnings (e.g., e-mails, messages on the SH
display, on application etc.) to inform the users about the firewalling decisions, how to improve the
network security, etc. In this way, the users should be able to customize the system to better suit their
needs. As an example a non-technical user could aim for maximum automatic protection, while a
skilled user could decide to ignore some threats and planned actions (at his own risk).
IDS SH_1 SLU SCNSH_n
Event Warning - Alarm
Warning - Alarm
message:	{	“shieldID”:	int,	“timestamp”:	str,	
“severity”:	bool,	“description”:	str}
ACK
message:	{	“mitigations”:	list}
Network Sentiment
Process
Network Sentiment
message:	{	“severity”:	bool,	“timestamp”:	str,	
“typeAffectedDevices”:	str,	“typeAttack”:	str,	
“prevention”:	list}
Network Sentiment
Figure 2. SHIELD blocks interaction.
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ISP-level 
attack ?
Yes
No
Modify SCN rules
Send mitigation(s) to “similar” user(s)
Network sentiment evaluation:
- Attack type
- Possible outcomes of the attack
- Available mitigation techniques
- Kind of devices affected
Alarm event
(attack detected)
Warning event
(suspicious activity detected)
Evaluate frequency 
and occurrence 
among different users
Figure 3. SLU logic.
4. Network Sentiment
The Network Sentiment should not be confused with a simple reaction to an ongoing threat. On the
contrary, the Network Sentiment is something that affects each user in a different way, and it should
be built according to a number of parameters that are inherently user-specific.
As an example, a user with no computers or devices of type X will not have his Network Sentiment
changed if there is an ongoing threat specifically targeted toward this kind of devices.
The Network Sentiment is also aimed at evaluating and reacting to threats that are spatially or
socially correlated. As an example, a port scan detected over a particular wireless network means
that the attacker is physically close to the target network. As a consequence, the physically nearby
networks must activate proper countermeasures.
However, the Network Sentiment protection can be extended to non-physical spaces, such as
participation in groups, e.g., social media, common interests, etc. An attack spreading through social
engineering and/or social media interactions can be actively mitigated.
As a matter of fact, the Network Sentiment must:
• Evaluate the presence of an attack (or the attack probability),
• Evaluate the means of the attack spreading, and
• Use the users similarities to strengthen the protection of the potential victims, where the users
similarities refers to the attack type, network kind (e.g., devices, topology), users’ behviour
(e.g., use of Internet services, online social relationships), network location, etc.
In order to evaluate the Network Sentiment, the SLU must collect several SH information e.g.,:
• The OS type and version being used in the Smart Home. This is necessary to evaluate the presence
of vulnerabilities in the devices.
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• The user’s location—to evaluate the likeliness of “geographical correlated” attacks
(e.g., Wi-Fi password cracking attempts)
• The user’s social behavior—to predict the spread of social-spreading malware, e.g., malware
carried by a social platform, such as Facebook.
• Ongoing attacks (low confidence, high confidence, confirmed),
• Attack type (e.g., DDoS, fault data injection),
• Attack effectiveness (i.e., if there are infected hosts in the user network),
• Number of blocked attacks,
• etc.
These informations can be organized in an Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format (IDMEF)
message [31] and sent to the ISP. The exact message encoding is not important in this context, but
it should be standardized to allow the interoperability between different vendors. Moreover, the
SLU must evaluate (CVE) reports [32] to properly block potential or ongoing threats and to suggest
possible actions to the users (e.g., system upgrades).
Thanks to the users reports, the ISP can compute different types of metrics. Some alert reports
(e.g., a confirmed ongoing attack) will result in an immediate response by the system. The reaction
will still be dependent on the attack type, e.g., a phishing attack could result in an alert to the ‘friends’
of the attacked used (measured by the mail messages, social media connections, etc.). Other attacks
will need more reports, possibly by different users, to trigger a response. This is particularly true for
suspicious activities that could be simply an unexpected, albeit normal, user behavior. In this case,
a consensus-based algorithm can be used to evaluate the threat.
The feedback from the SLU to the SH can be performed by IDMEF messages or, as in the previous
case, any other standard message type.
Summarizing, the exchange of the Network Sentiment informs both the SH and the SCN about the
ongoing attacks in the network. In this way, the whole ISP network is treated as one whole network,
without the distinction between (CN) and users s (LANs).
4.1. Enhanced Services Enabled by SHIELD
The SHIELD system is meant to protect the user network with minimal interaction with complex
devices like firewalls and IDS. However, to think about it as a simple security framework would be
reductive. As a matter of fact, the SHIELD devices can greatly improve the user experience and, at the
same time, provide a way to keep the user up-to-date with the current and ongoing threats to his/her
network without generating overreactions.
We believe that the user should be constantly aware of the status of their network, including
the ongoing attacks. However, this must not raise anxiety in the user, but promote a conscious
utilization of the network. As a consequence, the SH device must constantly communicate with the
user, e.g., by infographics on a display or via smartphone applications. Putting the user in the loop
can also increase the good behaviours of the users, like keeping their systems up-to-date, and even
the device vendors ones, increasing the chances that a vendor will actively support its products by
patching security bugs in the devices firmwares.
Moreover, we want to stress that SHIELD acts as a true IPS. As a matter of fact a ‘traditional’ IPS
can block an on going threat, while SHIELD can block a threat before hand, simply because another
user in close network is subject to the same threat. As a consequence, SHIELD is really an intrusion
prevention mechanism.
4.2. Security Considerations
Like every networked system, also SHIELD is sensible to threats. As a matter of fact, an attacker
could take advantage of the SHIELD system to fake an ongoing attack, causing (for example) a DoS.
For this reason, it is important that the SHIELD system is protected and considered as a primary asset
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of the ISP. If we define a security zone as a network area with a well-defined perimeter and a strict
boundary protection, we have that:
• The SLU and the SCN are in the same security zone,
• The SLU and the SH are in different security zones,
• The SCN and the SH are in different security zones.
In other terms, we can safely assume that the SLU and the SCN are inside the administrative
domain of the ISP and their communication security is automatically guaranteed. On the contrary,
a (MiM) attack between the SH and the ISP network is considered possible because an attacker can
disguise itself as a legitimate user. As a consequence, the communications between the IDS probes (or
the distributed IDS system) and the SH must be adequately secured.
It is out of the scope of this paper to describe the security algorithms that can be used to properly
secure the above mentioned communication channels but the system should, at minimum, provide a
strong authentication between the SH and the other two SHIELD entities, possibly by using certificates
and/or smart cards. Moreover, the SH device should pass severe vulnerability assessment tests and
be tamper-proof. If this is not the case, the SHIELD system must consider all the attacks reports
from the users as simple warnings (low confidence reports), and use consensus algorithms to reject
spurious data.
5. Smart Home Testbed
In order to evaluate the SHIELD framework, we built a prototype of the SH and the SLU.
In particular, the SH prototype is equipped with Ethernet, Wi-Fi and IEEE 802.15.4 interfaces. Moreover,
different attack types have been tested to evaluate the system feasibility.
The SHIELD testbed is shown in Figure 4. The SH (shown to the left) is an UDOO board and
an OpenMote CC2538 module as Border Router for 6LoWPAN (6LBR). The UDOO board is a single
board with an ARM Cortex-A9 CPU, RAM DDR3 (1 GB), GPIOs, microUSB ports, Gigabit Ethernet
and WiFi module while OpenMote-CC2538 is based on Texas Instruments CC2538 System on chip
with an IEEE802.15.4 transceiver. The SH has three local interfaces (Wi-Fi, Ethernet, and IEEE 802.15.4)
and an Ethernet link to the (emulated) ISP network. The SLU and part of the SCN have been emulated
with a virtual machine ( PC at top-right of Figure 4). The used Smart Home devices are connected
trhough the Ethernet, Wi-Fi and IEEE 802.15.4 interfaces of the SH. The attacks have been performed
with a normal PC (center right in Figure 4).
The SH monitors all data traffic of the private network on all involved interfaces. Whenever
SH detects an attack to some devices connected to the network, it generates an alert which is sent to
the SLU.
Without loss of generality, we used the Bro Network Security Monitor [33] to monitor the traffic,
with custom rules to detect the possible attacks used during the tests. Moreover, we have prepared a
python3 script in order to parse the IDS file logs searching for warning/alarms. The script parses both
Ethernet and Wi-Fi logs and, when a warning/alarm is found, contacts the SLU. In particular, the Bro
alerts have been converted to an appropriate interexchange format (IDMEF) and sent to the SLU for
further processing. In response to an alert, the SLU will send a command to the SH which will take
appropriate actions according to the type of threat detected. A simplified and interactive visualization
of the alert is also provided to the user through a graphical interface.
As mentioned earlier, the threat report could also not trigger any action of the SH in case
the Network Sentiment for that particular user, according to that particular attack, is not changed
(i.e., the attack is not relevant for the user). Nonetheless, the attack could be relevant for other users,
and it is important to report its presence. For this reason, the SLU inserts the threat in the Shield
database. In our experiment, the database is a MySQL db with customized tables.
The chosen hardware reflects as much as possible a normal Linux-based (CPE). As a consequence,
we expect that implementing the SH functionalities on a commercial CPE will be very easy. In this
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case, the CPE becomes the central element of the Smart Home network, guaranteeing not only the
device connectivity, but also the whole network security. However, it is also possible to use an external
SH unit, provided that it can monitor the home network links (wired and wireless).
SH
WSN
SLU/SCN
Attacker
Figure 4. SHIELD test bed.
5.1. Attacks
To test the SHIELD system functionalities, we implemented three types of attacks: a ransomware,
a port scan attack and an unauthorized access/query to the sensors via the CoAP.
5.1.1. Ransomware
To simulate the attack, we simulated a connection from a PC connected by Ethernet to an external
host on a particular set of ports and with a given payload signature. The attack can use TCP, UDP,
IPv4 or IPv6.
Figures 5 and 6 show, respectively, the detection of the two threats (ransomware on TCP and
UDP) by the parser log. Once the threat is detected, the IDS sends an alert to the SLU. In this case,
the reaction is to block the communication and promptly alert the user to take immediate actions.
SHIELD	Home	log:
Detected	Threat	type	1,	TCP,	src	192.168.11.100:48898,	dst	8.8.8.8:9999
SHIELD	DB	action:
INSERT	INTO	`shield'.`threats'	(`Threat_ID',	`Threat_name',	
					`src_net',	`src_ip',	`src_port',	`dst_net',	`dst_ip',	`dst_port',	`date')
			VALUES	(`1',	`Ransomware_TCP',	
					`LAN’,	`192.168.11.100',	`48898',	`WAN',	`8.8.8.8',	`9999',	`2016-12-20	15:58:46')
Figure 5. Detection of Ransomware attack on TCP.
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SHIELD	Home	log:
Detected	Threat	type	4,	UDP,	src	192.168.11.100:60409,	dst	8.8.8.8:9988
SHIELD	DB	action:
INSERT	INTO	`shield'.`threats'	(`Threat_ID',	`Threat_name',	
					`src_net',	`src_ip',	`src_port',	`dst_net',	`dst_ip',	`dst_port',	`date')
			VALUES	(`4’,	`Ransomware_UDP’,	
					`LAN’,	`192.168.11.100',	`60409',	`WAN',	`8.8.8.8',	`9988’,	`2016-12-20	16:01:12')
Figure 6. Detection of Ransomware attack on UDP.
5.1.2. Port Scanning
To simulate unauthorized intrusion, we performed a port scan on a LAN-connected host from a
machine connected via the Wi-Fi. The command is:
# nmap -6 -sS --data-string deadbeef 2001:db8:dead:c0de::b981
Figure 7 shows the detection of the port scanning attack by the IDS and, consequently,
the notification of the attack from the SH to the SLU. The reaction to this threat is twofold: the
attacker is isolated (e.g., by disconnecting the terminal from the WiFi), and the SH configuration is
updated to react to port scanning attacks. Moreover, the Network sentiment processor sends updated
configurations to the geographically close SHs. The updated configurations will also include increased
UDP port scan detection and an increased security against unauthorized access, for example by
forcing a key refresh on all the wireless devices. The last action can be justified by assuming that the
attacker gained access to the victim’s Wi-Fi network and, by extension, could also try to attack the
neighbor networks.
SHIELD	Home	log:
Detected	Threat	type	2,	TCP,	src	[2001:db8:dead:c0de:c05:77e7:b884:b7c1]:any,
																													dst	[2001:db8:dead:c0de:d9f7:6a6b:6650:4f0f]:any
SHIELD	DB	action:
INSERT	INTO	`shield'.`threats'	(`Threat_ID',	`Threat_name',	
					`src_net',	`src_ip',	`src_port',	`dst_net',	`dst_ip',	`dst_port',	`date')
			VALUES	(`2',	`PortScan_TCP',	
					`WIFI',	`2001:db8:dead:c0de:c05:77e7:b884:b7c1',	`any',	
					`LAN',	`2001:db8:dead:c0de:d9f7:6a6b:6650:4f0f',	`any',	`2016-12-20	16:09:21')
Figure 7. Detection of a port scan from an host in the Wi-Fi network.
5.1.3. IoT Devices Attacks
We focus more closely on the application layer to detect attacks against the normal operation
rules of the CoAP protocol.
In 6LoWPAN network, CoAP was designed for resource-constrained devices with the goal of
guaranteeing interoperability with the web. It uses UDP over IP as transport stack. A 4-byte fixed
header and a compact encoding of options are taken on to reduce the transmission overhead by limiting
the fragmentation on the link layer.
As previous shown in Section 2 the attacks on routing operations with RPL are analyzed mainly
in literature although the using of security mechanism such as DTLS in CoAP (CoAPs) does not assure
protection against DoS and other types of messages, e.g., malformed CoAP requests. As consequence
attacks against the application layer can be underestimated.
In this case, we consider an attacker that attempts to interrogate a sensor via the CoAP protocol [9],
trying to read the device hardware and firmware characteristics. This kind of attack can have different
outcomes, ranging from violation of the privacy, to the devices battery draining.
In our tests, the attacker would read the sensor temperature and the board firmware details:
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# coap-client -v 5 coap://[v6addr]/sensor/temp
# coap-client -v 1 coap://[v6addr]/riot/board
where v6addr is 2001:db8:dead:c0de:7dfe:dff9:f7ff:ddf7.
In Figure 8 the attack is detected by the IDS and through the SH sent to the SLU. The detection is
triggered by the requests frequency and the suspicious request of the board firmware version. As a
matter of fact, the user only needs this information when upgrading the node firmware, while for
an attacker it represents an useful information to perform a targeted attack. The reaction includes a
limitation on the requests from the specific user (rate limit), alerts to the authorized users about the
suspicious activity, a more detailed analysis on the traffic from the attacker up to the advertisement to
the SCN unit.
SHIELD	Home	log:
Detected	Threat	type	3,	UDP,	src	[2001:db8:dead:c0de:d513:afd9:2309:4111]:49320,
																													dst	[2001:db8:dead:c0de:212:4b00:615:a5cd]:5683
SHIELD	DB	action:
INSERT	INTO	`shield'.`threats'	(`Threat_ID',	`Threat_name',	
					`src_net',	`src_ip',	`src_port',	`dst_net',	`dst_ip',	`dst_port',	`date')
			VALUES	(`3',	`CoAP_scan',	
					`WIFI',	`2001:db8:dead:c0de:d513:afd9:2309:4111',	`49320',	
					`IOT',	`2001:db8:dead:c0de:212:4b00:615:a5cd',	`5683',	`2016-12-20	16:09:21')
Figure 8. Detection for IoT attack.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we present an IoT security framework for the smart home environment. Our idea is
to reach a dynamic security level for this smart infrastructure based on a network sentiment analysis.
In the proposed architecture, smart gateway/firewalls at the ISP side and close to the user smart home
cooperate to detect and react against different types of attacks from within the smart home network,
i.e., the Wi-Fi, Ethernet world or from IoT devices. In particular, the user gateway did not have a
predefined and fixed security level established when it was installed but can change its security rules
and actions in reaction to the dynamic threat level measured by the SHIELD Logic Unit (SLU).
The two zones ISP and the smart home LAN cooperate in a unique integrated security framework.
For example, if the smart home gateway (the IDS system) detects an attack, it reacts and the same
information, distributed to the ISP, can be spread to the other gateways near to the smart home under
attack (e.g., in a building we can consider a gateway for each smart home) to increase also their security
and prevention level in a social security vision.
Our testbed validates the approach feasibility and that a simple CPE can easily perform all the
required tasks to guarantee a Smart Home security.
The examples demonstrate that the SHIELD architecture allows a great flexibility on the kind
of attacks to react to, without the installation of complex rules on the SH. Moreover, the Network
Sentiment analysis allows the integration of behavioral, signature or hybrid based IDSs, enhanced by
the knowledge of similarity-driven activity reports.
Future works will be oriented toward the design and evaluation of automatic attack correlation
engines, in order to enhance the SLU sentiment analysis processor. In particular, machine learning
algorithms are considered as potential candidates for the automatic interrelationship analysis between
attacks and users relationships (physical or social).
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Abbreviations
CN Core Network
CPE Customer Premises Equipment
CVE Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures
DoS Denial of Service
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IoT Internet of Things
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
ISP Internet Service Provider
LAN Local Area Network
MiM Man in the Middle
SLU SHIELD—Logic Unit
SH SHIELD—HOME
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